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THE CASE FOR AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE SPENDING  
AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS 
BY MARK NACKMAN 
…But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise.  
Of these, I mention two only.  
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military 
establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant 
action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk 
his own destruction.  
Our military organization today bears little relation to that 
known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed 
by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.  
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had 
no armaments industry.  American makers of plowshares 
could, with time and as required, make swords as well.  But 
now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of 
national defense; we have been compelled to create a 
permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to 
this, three and a half million men and women are directly 
engaged in the defense establishment.  We annually spend 
on military security more than the net income of all United 
States corporations.  
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a 
large arms industry is new in the American experience.  The 
total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in 
every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal 
government.  We recognize the imperative need for this 
development.  Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave 
implications.  Our toil, resources and livelihood are all 
involved; so is the very structure of our society.  
In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or 
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for 
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger 
our liberties or democratic processes. We should take 
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nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable 
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge 
industrial and military machinery of defense with our 
peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may 
prosper together.  
Akin to, and largely responsible for, the sweeping changes in 
our industrial-military posture, has been the technological 
revolution during recent decades.  
In this revolution, research has become central; it also 
becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily 
increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, 
the Federal government.  
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been 
overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and 
testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, 
historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific 
discovery has experienced a revolution in the conduct of 
research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a 
government contract becomes virtually a substitute for 
intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now 
hundreds of new electronic computers….  
…It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to 
integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the 
principles of our democratic system – ever aiming toward the 
supreme goals of our free society…”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since President Eisenhower’s famous “military-industrial complex” speech, 
delivered as he left office in January of 1961, there has been a healthy mistrust of 
America’s Aerospace and Defense companies by the general public.  Like any large 
industry, there are good and bad individuals, honest and dishonest, wholesome and 
                                                            
1 President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address, January 17, 1961. 
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corrupt.  The Aerospace and Defense sector is no exception to this.  There has been no 
shortage of scandals to sway the public’s opinion either.   
Some recent examples include the Boeing-Druyun procurement integrity and 
fraud case, were major Air Force systems acquisitions were biased in the Boeing 
Company’s favor by Darleen Druyun, a then senior Air Force procurement official, 
because of employment afforded to Druyun and members of her family.2  Or the even 
more recent and highly publicized fraud investigation of Kellogg, Brown & Root’s (KBR) 
cost accounting on the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
contracts.3  But there is little public attention to the vast majority of Aerospace and 
Defense procurements and programs which are executed properly, on-time, and 
ethically.   That said, at least two very important facts have radically changed since 
1961. 
A. U.S. CORPORATE PROFITS EXCEED TOTAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS 
First, it is no longer the case that total defense spending exceeds the net income 
of all U.S. companies.  In fact, the ratio has been radically inverted.  When U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed his government fiscal year 2010 
                                                            
2 See Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Comp. Gen. B-295401 et al., (Comp. Gen. Feb. 24, 
2005); Jeffrey Branstetter, Darleen Druyun: An Evolving Case Study in Corruption, Power, and 
Procurement, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 443 (2005); George Cahlink, Ex-Pentagon procurement 
executive gets jail time, GOV’T EXEC, 1 Oct 2004, available at: 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1004/100104g1.htm  last accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
3 See Elise Castelli, KBR contract accounts for ‘vast majority’ of contract fraud cases in war 
zones, FED TIMES, 4 May 2009, available at: 
http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=4072265, last accessed 4 May 2009; and Carrie 
Dann, Army’s largest contractor in Iraq under renewed attack, CONGRESS DAILY, 4 Mar 2009, 
available at: http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=42649&dcn=e_ndw, last 
accessed 7 May 2009. 
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Department of Defense budget, it called for top line total spending of 533.7 billion 
dollars.4  Whereas the net income of all U.S. companies (aka, ‘U.S. corporate profits’), 
even in a time of a significant financial downturn, has fluctuated between 1.2 to 2 trillion 
dollars over the past year.5   
Even with the somewhat controversial supplemental budgets in the 75 to 130 
billion dollar range, the ratio still has been turned over on its head.  Some would 
suggest that the actual spending on “military security” is significantly higher, when 
taking into consideration such outlays as the 22 billion dollars sought by the Department 
of Energy for nuclear weapons and other appropriations, such as for the Selective 
Service and the National Defense Stockpile, the 106 billion sought for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, the 43 billion sought for the Department of Homeland Security, the 49 
billion sought for foreign military and economic aid by the Department of State, or the 28 
billion sought by the Department of Treasury to fund military retirements benefits.6  But 
even that calculus brings the total to approximately 974 billion dollars7, still well under 
net U.S. profits. 
This change in the ratio of total defense spending vis-à-vis net U.S. corporate 
profits is not problematic.  In fact, it is probably the sign of a healthy democracy.  The 
                                                            
4 See OMB’s A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY, RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE, pages 54-57, 
available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/Department_of_Defense.pdf, last 
accessed 7 May 2009. 
 
5 See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#corporate, last accessed 5 May 2009. 
 
6 Winslow T. Wheeler, Defense budget baloney, appearing on POLITICO.COM, 6 May 2009, 
available at: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22149.html, last accessed 8 May 2009. 
 
7 Id. 
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purpose of this paper is not to advocate a return to that ratio of U.S. Aerospace and 
Defense spending.  However the fact that the ratio has been turned upside-down does 
demonstrate how Aerospace and Defense spending has been eclipsed by other U.S. 
commercial industries since President Eisenhower warned that the “military-industrial 
complex” might threaten to acquire “unwarranted influence.”8 
B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING IS THREATENED 
Second, the research and development that drove the “technological revolution” 
is threatened.  Even when, in 1961, President Eisenhower noted that the surge in 
“research has become central…” to that technological revolution,9 there were already 
disincentives for companies to develop intellectual property, especially in the context of 
government procurement.  This led to a decline which began to be felt at the height of 
the Cold War when American innovation began to suffer as a result of an outdated of 
policy toward patent rights in government contracts.  There was an attempt to rectify the 
problem with the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act which granted patent rights to certain 
government contractors for inventions developed with federal funds.10  While there is 
still need for reform in the Government’s policy toward technical data rights, there is an 
even greater need for reform in the tax policy for corporate spending on research and 
                                                            
8 President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address, January 17, 1961. 
 
9 Id. 
 
10 See Bayh-Dole Act or University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200-212; See also Eli Manzour, If You Fix It, They Will Come: Drawing Lessons 
Learned From Patents for Dealing with Rights in Technical Data, 38 Pub. Con. L.J. 667 at 668-
70 (2009). 
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development that extends well beyond government contractors.11  To understand this 
point, one most examine the whole story very carefully; patent rights are one thing, but 
the money to develop those patents is quite another. 
In government fiscal year 1962, the National Defense outlays for Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation totaled 6,319 million dollars.12  In government fiscal 
year 2009, it is estimated that Research, Development, Test and Evaluation outlays 
totaled 79,500 million dollars.13  Even after adjusting the 1961 outlays for inflation, it is 
clear that the United States has net-increased its Department of Defense Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation expenditures.   
However, the federal appropriations only tell a small part of the bigger picture.  
These outlays are only for the government funded research and development, which the 
Government pays Aerospace and Defense contractors to research, develop, test and 
evaluate on the Government’s behalf.  These are nowhere near the true measure of 
American research and development efforts because they do not represent the amount 
of private capital spent by those same contractors on internal research and 
development efforts.  This is a significant point of distinction. 
                                                            
11 See Eli Manzour, If You Fix It, They Will Come: Drawing Lessons Learned From Patents for 
Dealing with Rights in Technical Data, 38 Pub. Con. L.J. 667 (2009). 
 
12 HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 56, 
available at: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/hist.pdf. 
 
13 DOD RELEASES FISCAL 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, Department of Defense Press Release No. 
304-09, summary charts, slide 2, 7 May 2009, available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/FY10%20Budget%20Request.pdf, last accessed 7 May 2009. 
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For this other type of corporate research and development, companies are 
currently able to claim, up to 3 years retroactively, a dollar for dollar reduction of taxes 
for qualified expenditures on research and development.14  While there is a separate 
incentive to spend capital on research and development in order to obtain and 
subsequently enjoy the short term monopoly position from a patent or other intellectual 
property right, the significance of the incentive effect this research and development tax 
credit has for companies to conduct their own internal research and development 
cannot be overstated.   
However, Congress periodically allows this credit to expire; and it is currently 
slated to expire again at the end of December 2009.15  An expiration of this credit during 
this critical economic period would not just negatively impact research and development 
in the Aerospace and Defense industry; it would be felt in all U.S. industries; including 
but not limited to commercial sources of scientific, alternative energy, pharmaceutical, 
and medical research and development.  For an economy in need of immediate 
stimulus, slowing down any corporate research and development would certainly be a 
step in the diametrically opposite required direction. 
Furthermore, the currently proposed Department of Defense budget would result 
in an actual 1.1 percent or .9 billion dollar net reduction of Defense Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation appropriations from the previous year; to be 
                                                            
14 See IRS Code §41; Treasury Regulation § 1.41-2; see also Public Law 110-343. 
 
15 Id. 
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distinguished from the slightly less significant decline that a 1% spending baseline16 
reduction would represent.17  Thus in the Aerospace and Defense sector, the impact of 
the expiration of the tax credit would certainly not be made up by any increased 
appropriations for government funded Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.  In 
fact, the 1.1 percent reduction would compound the problem by reducing a potential 
second source of research funding. 
Congress’ hodgepodge approach of occasionally passing retroactive tax credits 
for research and development not only results in the short term risk of magnifying the 
current economic downturn, it is also incredibly disruptive to companies attempting to 
plan their research efforts over the longer term, which in turn inhibits efforts to perform 
large scale, high payoff research and development projects that require multiple years 
to complete.  Perhaps even more significant is the relative disadvantage in which this 
places U.S. companies, and consequently the U.S. as a whole, vis-à-vis foreign 
companies and Governments. 
As highlighted in a 10 December 2008 letter to the Senate and House majority 
and minority leaders from a collection of 12 Aerospace representing organizations and 
associations: 
An increasing amount of research funding is being 
committed in countries – such as Ireland, Canada and China 
–because more attractive Research and Development (R&D) 
                                                            
16 See Allen Schick, THE FEDERAL BUDGET POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS, 3d Ed, at 324 (2007). 
 
17 DOD RELEASES FISCAL 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, Department of Defense Press Release No. 
304-09, summary charts, slide 2, 7 May 2009, available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/FY10%20Budget%20Request.pdf, last accessed 7 May 2009. 
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tax incentives are available outside the United States.  Thus, 
the U.S. has already fallen out of the top rank of 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries offering tax incentives for private sector R&D.  The 
R&D tax credit provides a critical and effective incentive for 
companies to increase their investment in U.S.-based 
research and development.18 
The facts clearly demonstrate that America’s Aerospace and Defense industry 
has declined in two important areas.  Areas that President Eisenhower saw fight to 
highlight as significant in his 1961 farewell address.  The cold war is over, but new 
threats have taken its place.   While Secretary Gates admonished that “[t]he United 
States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense 
budgets, to do everything and buy everything,”19 his observations were focused in the 
context of the National Defense Strategy20, and not in consideration of the potential 
utility of Aerospace and Defense spending as U.S. economic stimulus.  This paper will 
examine the economic, policy, and legal arguments in favor of Aerospace and Defense 
spending as a useful form of federal economic stimulus spending.  It will conclude with 
two recommendations to that end. 
                                                            
18 Letter to The Honorable Nancy Pelosi, The Honorable Harry Reid, the Honorable Mitch 
McConnell, and the Honorable John Boehner, signed by Aerospace Industries of America, Air 
Transport Association, Airport Consultants Council, Airports Council International-North 
America, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, American Association of Airport Executives, 
Cargo Airline Association, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, National Air Carrier 
Association, National Business Aviation Association, National Association of State Aviation 
Officials, and Regional Airline Association, dated 10 Dec 2008, available at: http://www.aia-
aerospace.org/assets/letter_joint_economic_stimulus_121008.pdf, last accessed 7 May 2009. 
 
19 Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy, Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan/Feb 2009, at 28. 
 
20 See NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY, Jun 2008, available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf, last accessed 7 
May 2009. 
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II. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE AS STIMULUS 
In early 2009, as the 44th President of the United States’ administration 
transitioned into the oval office, incoming President Barrack Obama and his staff began 
articulating strategies for stimulus spending in an attempt to curb the impending global 
economic recession.  During that time, three tenets were advanced as the 
administration’s guiding principles for economic stimulus proposals; that such spending 
should be: 1) timely (rapidly infuse money into economic circulation), 2) targeted 
(represent clear value to the United States), and 3) temporary (not establish any new 
mandatory budget entitlement programs or other programs that require such continued 
spending that adds to the long-term fiscal problems already facing the United States).21   
Assuming these three principles are indeed valid and that they continue to be the 
guiding principles for future federal stimulus spending, Aerospace and Defense 
spending fits squarely into the box as timely, targeted, and temporary and thus 
appropriate stimulus spending.  Yet during this period of critical public discourse, 
increased Aerospace and Defense spending as a form of economic stimulus is 
seemingly off the table.  As some astute commentators noted, “[i]n all the talk of 
economic stimulus in the White House and on Capitol Hill, one element has been 
conspicuously absent: defense programs.”22   
                                                            
21 Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, Here’s How to Make a Real Stimulus Take Flight, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 8, 2009, at B03. 
 
22 Id. 
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As the Harvard University economist and chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors Martin Feldstein testified in a statement for the House Democratic Steering 
and Policy Committee:  
Since the defense budget is as large as all of the other 
discretionary spending combined, it is surprising that 
defense is not proposed as part of the overall stimulus 
package.  It is surprising also to read in the press that there 
will be reductions in military spending because, according to 
those stories, of the weakness of the economy.  That logic is 
exactly backwards.  The overall weakness of demand in the 
economy implies that the next two years are a time when 
military spending and other forms of spending should 
rise….Buying military supplies and equipment, including a 
variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can easily fit this 
surge pattern.23 
 
A. TIMELY 
As Professor Feldstein also wrote, “[i]f rapid spending on things that need to be 
done is a criterion of choice, the plan should include higher defense outlays, including 
replacing and repairing supplies and equipment, needed after five years of fighting.  The 
military can increase its level of procurement very rapidly.”24 
Aerospace and Defense spending is capable of providing a “rapid infusion of 
dollars into economic circulation”25 because funds are already being appropriated and 
                                                            
23 Martin Feldstein, The Economic Stimulus and Sustained Economic Growth, Full Statement for 
the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, 7 Jan 2009, available at 
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/EconomicStimulusandEconomicGrowthStatement.html, last 
accessed on 4 May 2009. 
 
24 Martin Feldstein, An $800 Billion Mistake, originally published in WASH. POST. Jan 29, 2009, 
now available at: http://www.nber.org/feldstein/washingtonpost_012909.html, last accessed on 4 
May 2009. 
 
25 Id. 
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allocated, and can simply continue to be.  As a matter of Congressional timing, 
increasing those amounts is a far more straightforward and expedient matter as 
opposed to the creation of new programs, with new appropriations.  In fact, existing 
federal government contracts can be utilized immediately as a vehicle for injecting 
stimulus dollars.  In the case of Cost-Reimbursement and Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, it is a simple matter of adding funding or placing new 
orders.26   
As a matter of administrative timing, using existing contracts to inject stimulus 
has the important benefit of avoiding the loss of time required to announce, compete, 
and award new contracts because all of that work has already been accomplished.  This 
is especially relevant after a year that saw a 17% increase in the volume of contract 
award bid protests at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to include the 
Boeing Company’s high profile and successful Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
bid protest of the United States Air Force’s would-be 100 billion dollar plus ‘KC-X’ 
contract award to Northrop Grumman.27 
In examination of how current Aerospace and Defense programs may be utilized 
to channel economic stimulus spending, take the case of the United States Air Force’s 
F-22 Raptor program, which Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, John Young decided not to certify for further production on 3 March 
                                                            
26 See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 16.3, and FAR 16.5. 
 
27 GAO BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008, Comp. Gen. B-
158766; and The Boeing Company, Comp. Gen. B-311344 et al., (C.G. Jun. 18, 2008). 
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200928, and Secretary Gates forwarded a Defense Budget to the White House 
recommending the end of F-22 Raptor production, phasing out total production at 187, 
an increase of only four total aircraft over previous production plans.29  According to 
advertisements placed by the F-22 Raptor Team (including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, 
Pratt & Whitney, BAE Systems, Curtiss-Wright, GE, GKN, Goodrich, Hamilton 
Sundstrand, Honeywell, Northrop Grumman, Parker Aerospace and Raytheon) and the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, the F-22 program 
employs some 95,000 workers.30  There are few stimulus options more ‘timely’ than the 
continued employment of 95,000 workers.  Yet, the White House is putting forth a 
budget that would do just the opposite.   
In addition, because the decision to cease production of the F-22 Raptor for U.S. 
orders logically would require the shutdown of that production line; it also almost 
guarantees that the multirole fighter will never be produced for export, or sold to even 
the closest of U.S. allies; denying the F-22 Raptor Team of a significant source of 
downstream revenues, to say nothing of the lost potential for increased return on the 
research and development investment for the U.S. Air Force and American taxpayers, 
or the increased international security our allies could be helping to provide with the F-
                                                            
28 David A. Fulghum, Young Signs F-22 ADM to Keep Options Open, AVIATION WEEK, 4 Mar 
2009, available at: 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/F22030409.xml&headline=Young%
20Signs%20F-22%20ADM%20to%20Keep%20Options%20Open&channel=defense, last 
accessed on 7 May 2009. 
 
29 DEFENSE BUDGET RECOMMENDATION STATEMENT (ARLINGTON, VA), AS PREPARED FOR 
DELIVERY BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES, ARLINGTON, VA, MONDAY, APRIL 06, 
2009, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341, last 
accessed on 7 May 2009. 
 
30 See Full Page Ad at WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, at A12; also available at http://www.f22-
raptor.com/advocacy/index.html, last accessed, 4 May 2009. 
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22 Raptor in their air forces.31  Furthermore, the decision to bring the program to an end 
will fail to fully capitalize on the ever increasingly efficient production the F-22 program 
has seen, with a unit flyaway cost that has already decreased by 35% since full-rate 
production began.32  The F-22 Raptor is just one of many potentially ‘timely’ stimulus 
levers available to the Federal Government.  Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Future Combat 
Systems (FCS), Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), NASA’s Constellation 
program, and many other Aerospace and Defense programs have similar or even larger 
economies of scale. 
The ‘timeliness’ aspect of Aerospace and Defense programs should be viewed in 
stark contrast to even ‘shovel ready’ infrastructure programs being put forth by the 
White House.  As commentators have already noted, proposed infrastructure programs 
require “lengthy planning, design and approval processes” whereas “extending efficient, 
already running defense procurements would have brief, as the military says, ‘flash-to-
bang’ times.”33  Federal funds spent on existing defense programs would have impact 
beyond the immediate infusion of money to the prime defense contractors.  Such 
expenditures would yield a “multiplying effect” throughout the domestic supply chain and 
thus U.S. economy, as can be partially observed just by the extensive list of F-22 
Raptor Team defense contractors.34   
                                                            
31 Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, supra. 
 
32 U.S. House of Representatives Letter to President-elect Obama, dated 21 Jan 2009, available 
at: http://www.f22-raptor.com/advocacy/documents/F22Final.pdf, last accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
33 Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, supra. 
 
34 Id. 
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Furthermore, as elucidated in a 16 January 2009 U.S. Senate letter to then 
President-elect Barrack Obama, signed by a bi-partisan group of 44 United States 
Senators, “The F-22 program annually provides over $12 billion of economic activity to 
the national economy...”35  Therefore, as viewed through the lens of just the F-22 
Raptor program alone, Aerospace and Defense industry spending has the potential to 
be among the most ‘timely’ forms of expenditure available for a would-be stimulus 
planner to utilize. 
B. TARGETED 
“Defense spending could well be the most precisely targeted form of stimulus 
spending.”36  Unlike the billions of dollars in grant money that will flow from the Federal 
Government to state and local Governments, as a result of rigorous accounting and 
auditing standards37 and the existence of dedicated federal agencies such as the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA), the Federal Government already has well structured insight into how 
Aerospace and Defense contract dollars are spent.  Further, there are well established 
forums in the Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims where the 
Federal Government can ultimately enforce its rights and resolve contract disputes.  
Granted, those systems of accounting and auditing do not always work perfectly or 
instantaneously, there has been a longtime deficiency in the size of the government 
                                                            
35 U.S. Senate Letter to President-elect Obama, dated 16 Jan 2009, available at: http://www.f22-
raptor.com/advocacy/documents/ObamaF-22Jan1609.pdf, last accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
36 Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, supra. 
 
37 See, generally FAR Subpart 15.4. 
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acquisition workforce, and there are the occasional cases of misconduct and fraud.  
However, the federal acquisition systems is vastly superior in comparison to the 
patchwork of tracking processes the various state and local Governments may or may 
not have in place for federal grants. 
As highlighted by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), an industry trade 
association formed in 1919 representing “the nation’s leading manufacturers and 
suppliers of civil, military, and business aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial systems, 
space systems, aircraft engines, missiles, materiel, and related components, 
equipment, services, and information technology,”38 the U.S. Aerospace and Defense 
industry includes over 30,000 companies in all 50 states.39  Furthermore, Aerospace 
and Defense companies account for “over 2 million middle class jobs.”40  As a targeted 
industry, Aerospace and Defense represents access to the entire country for potential 
stimulus dollars to ‘trickle down’ through the supply base. 
In addition to its vast reach across the entire country, Aerospace and Defense is 
also the United States’ leading manufacturing export industry, with 97 billion dollars in 
exports last year.41  Furthermore, the types of careers that exist in this industry are 
decisively high tech, science and engineering positions, in contrast to many of the types 
of jobs ‘shovel ready’ construction projects would potentially create.  As AIA explains:  
                                                            
38 See http://www.aia-aerospace.org/about_aia/, last accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
39 See http://www.aia-aerospace.org/, last accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. 
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Our people bring a diverse set of skills and capabilities to 
their jobs: engineers on the cutting edge of advanced 
materials, structures and information technology; machinists 
fabricating complex shapes and structures, utilizing the latest 
fabrication technologies; and technicians from almost every 
degree field, testing, applying and integrating the latest 
technologies. Most of these positions are high-skill, quality 
jobs, paying above average wages. Production workers 
average $29.37 an hour;42 entry-level engineers average 
more than $74,000 a year, with more senior engineers well 
into six figures.43 And that employment has grown steadily 
for years.  Many of these jobs are unique, and require skills 
that take time to develop. It takes ten years for a degreed 
aerospace engineer to master the intricacies of aerospace 
vehicle designs.  Technicians skilled in applying stealth 
coatings, programmers fluent in satellite-control algorithms, 
metallurgists expert in high-temperature jet engine design -- 
these skills and many more are very hard to replace.44 
 
The Aerospace and Defense industry is also one of the U.S.’ healthiest, even in 
the current harsh financial environment.  Unlike the financial or automotive industries, 
Aerospace sales increased last year by 2.1 percent; as AIA president and CEO Marion 
Blakey stated, “’[w]e anticipate this to continue, and we expect our industry will continue 
to be an asset to the U.S. economy as we climb out of our current financial 
hardships.”45  Thus Aerospace and Defense is also one of soundest industries the 
Federal Government can turn to right now as an engine of stimulus. 
                                                            
42 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics survey. January-June 2008. 
 
43 AVIATION WEEK Workforce Study, 2008. 
 
44 Aerospace and Defense: The Strength to Lift America, available at: http://www.aia-
aerospace.org/assets/wp_strength_nov08.pdf. last accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
45 AIA News 2008, Aerospace Shows Strength in Harsh Financial Atmosphere, 10 Dec 2008, 
available at: http://www.aia-
aerospace.org/newsroom/aia_news/2008/Aerospace_Shows_Strength_in_Harsh_Financial_At
mosphere, last accessed on 8 May 2009. 
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The economic analysis of Aerospace and Defense spending as ‘targeted’ 
stimulus is further strengthened by the clear value it represents to the United States 
when one considers the national security benefits of maintaining: 1) a state-of-the-art 
inventory and arsenal, 2) our position as the dominant leader in space, 3) the industrial 
production capability of the United States, and 4) the intellectual base of educated and 
skilled workers necessary to build future Aerospace and Defense products.   
Furthermore, as Professor Feldstein notes, “[r]eplacing the supplies that have 
been depleted by the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of 
something that might be postponed but that instead should be done quickly.  The same 
is true for replacing the military equipment that has been subject to excessive wear and 
tear.  More generally, replacement schedules for vehicles and other equipment should 
be accelerated to do more during the next two years than would otherwise be 
economically efficient.”46  These benefits will be further examined under Policy 
Arguments for Aerospace and Defense as Stimulus; however it is clear from the above 
analysis that the ‘target-able’ nature of Aerospace and Defense spending is well 
established. 
C. TEMPORARY 
Aerospace and Defense spending as a form of economic stimulus can easily be 
accomplished in a manner that does not establish any new mandatory budget 
entitlement programs or other programs that require such continued spending so as to 
                                                            
46 Martin Feldstein, Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus, originally published in THE 
WALL ST. J., 24 December 2008, now available at: 
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/wsj12242008.html, last accessed 4 May 2009. 
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add to the long-term fiscal problems already facing the United States.47  As some 
commentators have already recognized, “[i]n the post-Cold War ‘drawdown,’ the active-
duty military was reduced by 700,000, and weapons buys were cut by at least one-third 
– that’s what produced the so-called peace dividend of the 1990’s.”48  As quickly as 
Aerospace and Defense programs can be continued, they can cease to be so as well.   
Going back to the F-22 Raptor program example, the continued production of 
such a program for just one or two additional years would be just that, one or two years 
of additional ‘temporary’ stimulus spending.  As easily as programs such as the F-22 
Raptor, Airborne Laser (ABL), FCS, and GMD are being removed from the budget now, 
programs could be scaled back latter, thus making increased Aerospace and Defense 
spending truly ‘temporary’ in nature and not exacerbating any long-term fiscal 
constraints already affecting the United States.49 
INCREASING MILITARY RECRUITING NOT TRULY ‘TEMPORARY’ 
Some pundits have championed increased military recruiting as an additional 
avenue for potential economic stimulus spending and engine of job creation.50  Such a 
plan would potentially have the benefits of providing a reduction in unemployment, the 
eventual creation of a larger, more skilled civilian workforce, and also potentially expand 
                                                            
47 THE NATION’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK SEPTEMBER 2008 UPDATE, GAO-09-44R. 
 
48 Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, supra. 
 
49 THE NATION’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK, supra. 
 
50 Id; and Martin Feldstein, An $800 Billion Mistake, supra. 
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the military reserves.51  Others have gone even one step further, asserting that 
“[i]ncreasing the size of the armed forces would have an even more direct and 
immediate effect on employment: Almost all military spending on personnel occurs 
within the year of appropriation.”52   
While these arguments appear persuasive from the perspective of reducing 
unemployment, it should be noted that simply because all military personnel or “MilPers” 
appropriations (which are used to fund military members pay and benefits) are one-year 
appropriations53, it does not necessarily follow that military members do not have costs 
beyond a single given budgetary year.  That would be a gross oversimplification.  In 
fact, increasing military recruiting is not as ‘temporary’ a solution as simply continuing to 
fund active Aerospace and Defense programs for additional time.  The reason is 
twofold.   
First, not all newly recruited military members will leave the service after a 
convenient ‘temporary stimulus period’ on active duty, and even those that stayed in the 
reserves would generate a continued cost.  Second, there is a significant tail of benefits 
that follow honorable military service.  Primarily administered by the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, such benefits include: educational benefits, housing loans, death and 
burial benefits, and of course, potential medical and disability payments.  To the extent 
that at least some of the new ‘stimulus’ recruits would tap into these benefits in the long-
                                                            
51 Id. 
 
52 Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, supra. 
 
53 DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2-A, Chapter 1, page 1-6, Oct 2008.; see 
also Schick, THE FEDERAL BUDGET at 330. 
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term, they would establish new mandatory budget entitlements requiring continued 
spending so as to add to the long-term fiscal problems already facing the United 
States.54  Conversely, while most major systems acquisitions come with a logistics and 
maintenance tail; it can be priced into the cost of the procurement up front.  Increasing 
military recruiting as a form of stimulus goes against the stated criteria of ‘temporary.’ 
Therefore, increased military recruiting is not recommended as appropriate stimulus 
spending as it fails to comply with the White House’s principles for proper economic 
stimulus. 
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE AS STIMULUS 
On February 17, 2009, President Barrack Obama signed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), commonly known as the ‘stimulus package.’55  
A few months prior, in late 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), 
commonly known as the ‘bailout,’ was established with the passing and signing of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 by President George W. Bush.56  During 
the discussion and debates surrounding the bailout and stimulus plans, two major topics 
continually arose in the public discourse: 1) so-called ‘But American’ provisions57, and 
2) executive compensation.58   
                                                            
54 See THE NATION’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK, supra. 
 
55 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.L. 111-5. 
 
56 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Publ.L. 110-343. 
 
57 A 4 May 2009 Google search for “Stimulus Buy America” yielded 3,239 News results. 
 
58 A 4 May 2009 Google search for “TARP Executive Compensation” yielded 946 News results. 
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Aerospace and Defense expenditures by the Federal Government are uniquely 
positioned to satisfy both of these policy objectives without additional regulation, 
extraordinary steps taken to recoup executive compensation, or violation of any 
international treaties that especially some Buy America requirements had the potential 
to raise.  Finally, there is a third policy reason to consider the case for Aerospace and 
Defense spending as appropriate stimulus.  That reason is the inherent national security 
benefit. 
A.  BUY AMERICAN 
Domestic preferences are nothing new in the world of U.S. federal spending; 
such requirements have long and often found their way into the federal procurement 
policy and regulations.59  It was at the center of the public policy controversy 
surrounding the Boeing protest of the KC-X contract to Northrop Grumman and their 
major subcontract partner, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) 
– although the legal basis of the GAO protest had nothing to do with it.60  Even on the 
presidential campaign trail, then candidate Obama commented that he had a difficult 
time believing that “an American company that has been a traditional source of 
aeronautic excellence” was not selected and that he was committed to “fight to ensure 
                                                            
59 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 §832 (Pub. L. 107-107); 10 
U.S.C. §2241, now codified at 10 U.S.C. 2533a and 2533b; see also 73 Fed. Reg. 11354 (Mar. 
3, 2008). 
 
60 See The Boeing Company, Comp. Gen. B-311344 et al., (C.G. Jun. 18, 2008). 
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that public contracts are awarded to companies that are committed to American 
workers.”61 
The ‘Buy American’ public policy agenda again surfaced in the context of the 
stimulus package’s ARRA when §1605 of that act created the requirements that all iron, 
steel and manufactured goods, purchased under ARRA for the use in public works and 
buildings, must be produced within the United States.62  This requirement was 
importantly qualified in the U.S. Senate version of the ARRA, partially in response to 
numerous procurement and international trade experts warning of the potential to 
violate current international treaties and spark a trade war.63  The Senate version added 
the caveat “in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international 
agreements.”64 
1. BUY AMERICAN PROVISIONS AT ODDS WITH TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The problem with the original ARRA language and Buy America provisions in 
general, is that they run the risk of violating the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which has 40 signatory members, 
                                                            
61 Steve Schooner & Chris Yukins, Tempering ‘Buy America’ In The Recovery Act – Steering 
Clear Of A Trade War, 51 GC ¶ 78 (Mar 11, 2009). 
 
62 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.L. 111-5, §1605. 
 
63 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, Buy America: Bad for Jobs, Worse for 
Reputation, PIIE POLICY BRIEF 09-02 (Feb 2009), available at: 
www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb09-2.pdf, last accessed 7 May 09; see also Steve 
Schooner & Chris Yukins, Tempering, supra. 
 
64 See CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Feb. 4, 2009 at S1528; see also Steve Schooner & Chris 
Yukins, Tempering, supra. 
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including the United States and 27 European Union countries.65  The matter is 
additionally controversial in light of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between Canada, Mexico and the United States.66 
The results of the trade agreements like GPA and NAFTA are that signatory 
nations are supposed to give each other reciprocal access in public procurements.67  
The United States was able to negotiate exceptions to the GPA regarding U.S. federal 
highway and transit projects, as part of existing ‘Buy American’ statutes dealing with 
both.68  However federal highway and transit projects are only one of many categories 
of GPA and NAFTA public procurements. 
 This has led some experts within the procurement law community, such as 
Professors Steve Schooner and Chris Yukins of the George Washington University Law 
School, to sound the alarm that the ‘Buy American’ requirements in the ARRA “remain 
extremely controversial.”69  Specifically they advise, “[t]he optimal approach seems to 
be the most simple: to fold new procurement under the Recovery Act into the existing 
                                                            
65  See, Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), available in English at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm, last accessed 7 May 2009; see 
also Trade Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979, Pub.L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 19 U.S.C. §2501-2581. 
 
66 See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), available in English at: 
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343, last accessed 7 May 2009. 
 
67 See GPA and NAFTA, Id. 
 
68 See GPA, Appendix I Annexes-General Notes, available in English at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm; see also David W. Burgett & 
Lewis E. Leibowitz, Feature Comment: How Will Buy America Restrictions Affect Economic 
Stimulus Spending?, 51 GC ¶ 51 (Feb 18, 2009). 
 
69 Steve Schooner & Chris Yukins, Tempering, supra. 
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FAR regulatory structure, which, in keeping with the Recovery Act, accommodates the 
U.S.’ many trade agreements.”70 
2. AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE SPENDING CONSISTENT GPA AND NAFTA, YET 
RESULTS IN STRONG DOMESTIC PROCUREMENT PREFERENCES 
As Professors Schooner and Yukins go on to recommend, “[t]he simplest, most 
expeditious and elegant approach would be to fold Recovery Act procurement, when 
under-taken by federal agencies, into the existing regulatory structure in FAR pt. 25…” 
as a means of complying with the GPA and NAFTA requirements.71  “The existing 
structure in FAR pt. 25 provides a pragmatic solution, for FAR pt. 25 both permits and 
excludes foreign vendors.”72  FAR 25 also expressly prohibits foreign acquisition from 
certain countries “without open-market agreements with the U.S., such as China, and 
creates a (so-called) ‘walled garden’ for vendors from the U.S. and from nations with 
open-market agreements.”73  Therefore, federal procurement of Aerospace and 
Defense programs would both comply with the U.S. Trade Agreements, to the extent 
they are subject to FAR 25,74 and not run the risk of triggering an international trade war 
by drawing international attention to new protectionist, Buy American statutory 
language.  
                                                            
70 Id. 
 
71 Id.; see also FAR PART 25 - FOREIGN ACQUISITION. 
 
72 Id. 
 
73 Id. 
 
74 See FAR 25. 
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As a result of this, and as Professor Feldstein and others have already taken 
note of, “[m]ilitary procurement has the further advantage that almost all of the 
equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the United States, creating 
demand and jobs here at home.”75  There are several additional reasons for this result, 
in addition to the complicated government procurement decision tree set forth in FAR 
Part 25. 
Many of the larger U.S. Aerospace and Defense procurements and programs 
require those contractors working not them to have U.S. security clearances for their 
facilities and employees, which require U.S. citizenship.76  Even more of those 
procurements and programs, including subcontracts down through the entire supply 
chain, are subject to the U.S. export controls regime, which restricts access to sensitive 
facilities, materials and information identified on the United States Munitions List 
(USML)77 to “U.S. Persons” only, without prior license or other approval from the U.S. 
Department of State.78  Finally, many of the U.S. Aerospace and Defense contractors 
are unable to be acquired by would-be foreign investors as a result of regulation by the 
                                                            
75 Martin Feldstein, Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus, supra. 
 
76 See DoD 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), 28 
Feb 2006, available at: 
https://www.dss.mil/GW/ShowBinary/DSS/isp/fac_clear/download_nispom.html, last accessed 8 
May 2009. 
 
77 See 22 U.S.C. § 2751; The United States Munitions List (USML), 22 C.F.R. pt 121 (2008). 
 
78 See 22 U.S.C. § 2751; International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-
130 (2008); see also Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (2000); Export 
Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 C.F.R. pt. 730 (2008).; see generally Robert A. Borich Jr., 
Globalization of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Developing Procurement Sources Abroad 
Through Exporting Advanced Military Technology, 31 PUB.CON.L.J. 623 (2002). 
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Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).79  The result is a 
strong preference for domestic companies in federal Aerospace and Defense 
procurements.  However, all of this is an already well established and excepted reality 
under the trade agreement regime.  Thus, federal Aerospace and Defense spending 
would include innate ‘Buy American’ preferences, without the controversy or potential 
for setting off an international trade war. 
B. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Few issues seemed to agitate Americans worse than exorbitant executive 
compensation, especially for executives of financial companies that would otherwise 
have failed without receiving ‘bail out’ funds under TARP.  However, unlike the U.S. 
financial industry, the Aerospace and Defense industry already has checks in place to 
limit executive compensation. 
This is because the White House’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), 
part of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), pursuant to their authority under 
Section 39 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act as amended,80 and in 
consult with the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, determined that the 
executive compensation ‘benchmark’ for government contractors in government fiscal 
year 2009 shall be capped at $684,181.81  While this determination does not strictly limit 
what government contractor executives may receive in compensation from their 
                                                            
79 See Exec Orders 11858 (1975); 12661 (1988); and 13456, (2008). 
 
80 See Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974, 41 U.S.C. § 435 et seq. 
 
81 See OFPP-Determination of Executive Compensation Benchmark Amount, 74 Fed. Reg. 
23893, May 21, 2009. 
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companies or organizations; it does limit the amount of executive compensation that will 
be considered ‘allowable’, and thus ultimately able to reimbursed as allocated overhead 
under government cost accounting standards, a significant disincentive for government 
contractors to set executive compensation over the OFPP “benchmark.”82 
Thus there will be no discussion in Congress of passing retroactive, draconian 
measures to reclaim portions of executive compensation paid by government 
contractors.  Aerospace and Defense contractors are subject additional regulations that 
enable to Federal Government to prevent excessive and unreasonable executive 
compensation and thus head-off potential public controversies stemming from stimulus 
funds being spent on Aerospace and Defense. 
Without any new or additional statutory provisions, Aerospace and Defense 
spending would be concordant with two of the most recently and intensely contested 
public policy concerns surrounding the Federal Government’s recent efforts to prevent 
further economic collapse and stimulate market growth.  Aerospace and Defense 
spending as stimulus is therefore both economically advantageous, and compatible with 
public policy. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION ONE:  INCREASE DEFENSE OUTLAYS BY TEN PERCENT FOR BOTH 
PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AND FIVE PERCENT 
FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
Rather than call out specific major programs to be funded or continued, which 
only comprise a small minority of the total Department of Defense budget, this paper’s 
                                                            
82 Id; see also FAR 31.205–6(p). 
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more general recommendation is like those of Professor Feldstein and others 
advocating general increases in defense outlays in focused areas.  This is partially 
because the general notion of increasing any spending in this area of appears to be the 
most controversial part of the entire recommendation to use Aerospace and Defense 
spending as economic stimulus. 
As Professor Feldstein recommends that for the next two years: 
[a] 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for 
research would contribute about $20 billion a year to the 
overall stimulus budget.  A 5% rise in spending on 
operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 
billion.  That spending would create about 300,000 additional 
jobs.83 
 
 These targeted increases would have maximum economic impact by stimulating 
the prime and subcontractors on the procurement side, the sagging research and 
development sector and the logistics and maintenance industries, at a total additional 
outlay of $40 billion over two years. 
V. RECOMMENDATION TWO: AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 TO MAKE 
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY TAX CREDIT PERMANENT 
Not all stimulus objectives are best achieved through appropriations spending; as 
evidenced by the case of the research and development tax credit.  In order to stave off 
the potential negative impacts an expiration in the research and development tax credit 
could have on the economy, the disadvantage it would place U.S. companies at vis-à-
                                                            
83 Martin Feldstein, Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus, supra. 
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vis foreign competition, and the destabilizing impact continued patchwork application of 
the research and development tax credit would have on long-term commercial research 
planning, it is recommended that the research and development tax credit be made 
permanent.  The recommendation is not to expand the scope of the credit, or increase 
the credit beyond a dollar for dollar ratio; rather to simply cease the heretofore 
piecemeal process of applying the credit by making it once and for all permanent.  This 
approach creates no new government spending, nor does it reduce revenues collected 
as a new tax credit would; it simply requires a continuation of the status quo, without the 
uncertainty and lack of uniformity of the current credit. 
There are several measures currently in Congress that would see this 
accomplished.  They include: House Bill 422 which was introduced by Representatives 
Kendrick Meek (D-FL) and Kevin Brady (R-TX) and is currently referred to the House 
Committee on Ways and Means;84 House Bill 783 which was sponsored by 
Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and also currently House Committee on 
Ways and Means85; and Senate Bill 37 which was sponsored by Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) and is currently referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.86 
H.R. 422 would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the 
research credit through 2010, and increase, and make permanent the alternative 
                                                            
84 See H.R. 422, available at:  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-422, last 
accessed 8 May 2009. 
 
85 See H.R. 783, available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-783, last 
accessed 8 May 2009. 
 
86 See S. 37, available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-37, last accessed 
8 May 2009. 
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simplified research credit.87  H.R 783 and S. 37 would simply amend the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to make the tax credit for increasing research activities 
permanent.88  The language of S. 37, which varies only slightly from the text of H.R. 
783, is: 
A BILL 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 
permanently extend the research credit. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF RESEARCH 
CREDIT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 is amended by striking subsection (h). 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Paragraph (1) of 
section 45C(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
amended by striking subparagraph (D).   
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this 
section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 
December 31, 2009.89 
 
It is recommended the United State implement the permanent research and 
development tax credit by utilizing Senator McCain’s bill, or similar language, ensuring 
the nation: continues to reap the economic stimulus benefits provided by research and 
development; that other nations do not gain further advantages against U.S. companies 
in their research and development; and enabling U.S. companies to plan long-term 
research and development most efficiently in order to maximize profits and shareholder 
value. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
                                                            
87 H.R. 422, Id. 
 
88 H.R. 783, Id.; and S. 37, Id. 
 
89 S. 37, Id. 
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The culminating two recommendations provide for an increase source or 
economic spending in a manner that best utilizes those appropriates and changes in tax 
policy, foregoing some federal revenues, which result in increase private capital being 
spent.  The increased federal expenditures will create additional jobs, stimulate the 
economies of all 50 states and provide the U.S. with increased national security during 
a period of increased international strife.  Finally, the recommended change in tax policy 
will put the U.S. research sectors on equal footing with foreign competition, insuring the 
future viability of American industry and ingenuity for years to come. 
Page 32 of 32 
 
